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In this paper we present an applied general equilibrium model with special features that allows for
comparative analysis of different pricing schemes. We look at Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing,  Marginal Cost Pricing as
well as an arbitrary water pricing increase for agriculture sectors. A standard AGE was adapted by explicitly
modeling water production with its different technologies. Water demand of different users also needed to be
refined since it is generally modeled with fixed coefficient with no substitution allowed. Results show that the
choice of applying one policy over another can rely on water management authority (or government) objectives.
Considering welfare criteria and water conservation objectives, Boiteux-Ramsey pricing seems to be the best
alternative. Moreover, we show that BRP clearly becomes more advantageous the more rigid (small capacities to
substitute water for other inputs) the economy and the efficiency of MCP decreases as the economy become more
rigid.
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When Water is No Longer Heaven Sent : Comparative Pricing
Analysis in an AGE Model
1. Introduction
Since early civilization, accessibility to water has been of great concern to government
authorities. During the time of ancient Rome, important distribution aqueducts were built to
supply water to the population.  Nine great aqueducts poured water into the Imperial City at a
rate similar to some reservoirs of our time.  The importance of these infrastructures at that time
can be illustrated by the following quotation taken from a third-century book on Roman
aqueducts: « Will anyone compare the idle Pyramids, or those other useless, though much
renowned structures of the Greeks, with these many indispensable aqueducts? » 
1
In modern civilizations, water continues to be the basis of life for living beings.   In
most countries of the world, large infrastructures continue to be built to improve the
accessibility of the resource for the population. However, these infrastructures and their
maintenance are extremely expensive.
People view water as a public good and the state as responsible for its harvest and
distribution among the population and different water consumers.  However, this type of
reasoning has greatly contributed to the water scarcity problem on our planet.  In the field of
economics, calls are made for the regulation of the demand side so as to stop the hemorrhage
of our resource instead of investing in reservoirs and pumping installations. This type of
reasoning is far from prevalent in the minds of consumers who benefit from favorable water
tariffs.  In fact, we find a particularly important lobby against increased water tariffs in the
agricultural sector.
                                                
1 Sextus Julius Frontinus, from his third-century book on the Roman aqueducts, De Aqueductibus Urbis Romae.3
In general, the price for irrigation water is far less than the one charged to households
and other industries.  When it exists, the price reflects a fraction of the cost or economic value
of irrigated water.  This type of pricing results in extensive waste in regions where water
scarcity prevails. These distortions necessarily lead to a non-optimal use of the resource among
consumers.
Most of the studies that put an emphasis on water tariff reforms for the resource have
restricted their analysis to a partial equilibrium framework (Agthe and Billings (1987) and
Tisdell (1996)), and consequently, have ignored the general interdependence mechanism of an
economy and the retroaction effects of agents following a change in the production and
demand structure.  We think that a study of a tariff reform should be done by examining the
interdependence effects of the economy as to measure more precisely the consequences on
resource allocation and social welfare.  To do so, we use an applied general equilibrium (AGE)
model of the Moroccan economy.  Morocco is faced with recurrent shortages of its resources
given the considerable distortions in the allocation between consumers. The approach that we
consider in this paper can be adapted to other countries faced with a similar situation.
2. Morocco’s Hydraulic Resources
Over the last few decades, Moroccan authorities have been forced to give greater
attention to the depletion of their water resources.  An excessive and persistent demographic
growth, an increasing urbanization and marked inequalities in the economy, such as grants to
agriculture, are some of several factors that are responsible for the increased pressure on the
resource.
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The renewable hydraulic resource comes from 150 billions m
3 per annum of rain.  From
this precipitation, 30 billions m
3 represents the efficient rain of the country. This efficient rain
can either flow into riverbeds or infiltrate the underground water table.  The volume of the rain
regenerating the rivers amounts to 20 billions m
3 and the rain regenerating the underground
water table totals 10 billion m
3.  Under favorable economic and technical conditions, 16
billions m
3 can currently be mobilized on the Moroccan territory (Mriouah (1992)).
The spatial variability of the Moroccan climate creates important regional disparity in
the accessibility to water. We can divide the different zones of the country into 2 main regions:
the northern region and the southern region. The potential water supply is much greater in
northern region than in the southern part of the country. In the northern region, we can count
three sub-zones: the Atlantic, Oriental and Mediterranean. These three sub-zones contain
90.8% of the country’s surface water and 64.4% of the ground water. The remaining supply is
found in the southern region.
The resource’s supply-demand gap is presently positive in the northern region and
negative in the south.  Forecasts indicate that the balance will be negative for the entire country
by the year 2020. The deficit should reach 200 million m
3 with a growth in the demand for
water of 4% per year (Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995)).
To escape the catastrophic impact of such a deficit, the Moroccan government has
undertaken an ambitious program to deal with the increasing demand.  The program proposes
the construction of a large dam and 6-10 small-to-medium dams per year to increase the
country’s water storage capacity (Water Power and Dam Construction, National Profile
(1991)). With these efforts and the investments made in irrigation distribution lines, the
budgetary share of public investments linked to water supply should increase from 25% to 60%
by the end of this century (Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995)). In the long-term, these massive
investments cannot be a sustainable answer for current water demand management.5
Morocco’s water demand management policies are almost non-existent in their effects.
As in other African countries and also in developed countries in North America and Europe,
pricing policies favor farmers with preferential rates for irrigation water. The price for
irrigation water is well below that charged to other users.
Three main reasons are usually evoked to explain these types of policies (Ayub and
Kuffner (1994)). First, water tariffs have always been highly subsidized. The inertia of the
consumption habit makes it very difficult to increase tariffs to respectable levels when they are
extremely low. Second, an increase in the price of water would clash with the fight against
unemployment. Unemployment is a major concern in countries similar to Morocco. An
increase in the price of irrigation water would undoubtedly have a negative effect on the
agricultural sector and consequently on rural households.  This shock could inadvertently
create an important exodus of rural households to already overpopulated urban regions. The
last justification is based on the food self-sufficiency policies pursued by most developing
countries.  An increase in water tariffs to the agricultural sector would contradict the basic
principle of these policies. An increase in irrigation price would most likely discourage
agricultural output.
For these reasons, authorities have had difficulties reforming pricing schedules for
water demand. Governments adopt more shortsighted programs by using more politically
correct tools, such as building dams and wells, among others, to fight against the increasing
demand for water.
3. Water Pricing and Production
Theoretically, in a partial equilibrium state, the Pareto optimal prices would be equal to
the marginal cost of producing water. However, given the cost structure of producing water6
(natural monopoly with important fixed costs), this type of pricing can lead to surpluses. But,
more generally, it leads to deficits. Consequently, authorities have to finance these deficits
through taxes. The taxation methods are almost all distorted
2, therefore a second best optimum
should be considered. Ramsey (1927) and then Boiteux (1956) proposed a taxation formula
that was further formalized by Baumol and Bradford in (1970). The method is commonly
known as Boiteux-Ramsey pricing (BRP). It has been widely used in various fields of
application by numerous authors
3. As stated by Baumol and Bradford (1970), the pricing
method consists of setting quasi-optimal prices for each market such that they deviate from the
marginal cost inversely proportionate to the demand price elasticity in the given market. In
other words, an inelastic demand will support higher prices under this pricing scheme.
The second best pricing method would be the prescription if the situation would be
applied in a partial equilibrium state. However, most taxation schemes are applied in general
equilibrium where branches as well as agents are interconnected with each other. We adopt the
general equilibrium framework while taking into account that the objectives of governments
can be threefold. First, they might want the most optimal resource allocation, second, they
would have objectives with respect to the level of deficits of water management authorities and
finally, the most important objective in the context of growing water scarcity, reducing water
consumption to prevent further depletion of the resource
4. Governments or water management
authorities (WMA) are then faced with these objectives and different water pricing options. As
stated earlier, the current water pricing system in Morocco is very distorted, leads to large
deficits and over-consumption of water. Three pricing options will be analyzed in an applied
                                                
2 The exception is a lump sum tax, but this form of taxation is seldom used for practical reasons.
3 For further theoretical discussion see Dierker (1991), and for applications see Zajak (1974), Tam (1988), Wilson
(1989), Cuthbertson and Dobbs (1996), Resende (1997), Kennet and Gabel (1997) and  Ebert (1998) among
others.7
general equilibrium framework: RBP, MCP and an arbitrary increase in agricultural prices of
water. From partial equilibrium results, we expect that RBP will lead to a zero deficit (from
WMA), an important reduction of water consumption, MCP will improve the allocation of
water between users (same prices for all users), and reduce water consumption. The arbitrary
increase in agricultural water prices should reduce curent distorted prices, reduce consumption
and reduce WMA deficits. The impact on real GDP in all cases is unclear due to the numerous
general equilibrium effects.
3.1. Marginal Cost Pricing
The marginal cost pricing approach implies that the marginal cost of producing water
equals the marginal benefit of consumption. In our model, we have three demands for water: (i)
residential, (ii) industrial and (iii) agricultural, which in turn are broken down given the
different regions and branches in our model. The equation defining the marginal pricing




eau mc Pw = .
3.2. Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing
In the BRP method, the government’s objective is to maximize consumer surpluses
while imposing a budgetary equilibrium on water authorities
5.
 We first suppose a water
                                                                                                                                                         
4 In this paper, we do not attempt to evaluate the optimal level of water production, this must be done with
appropriate dynamic analytical tools. We only suppose that the authorities have a general objective of reducing
water consumption since the present consumption level could lead to large water deficits.
5 Other fixed budgetary objectives could be imposed without substantially changing the problem. In that case the
right hand side of the budget constraint would simply be fixed to the objective. We also consider the case of8
demand function  ) (
d d Pw XD  as a function of water prices 
d Pw , where d = household, industries
and agriculture. The problem is presented as follows:
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Where mc is the marginal cost, TC is the total cost and l the langrange multiplier.
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Solving Equation (5) for Pw
d we obtain the Boiteux-Ramsey price equation for each
market:
                                                                                                                                                         
partial equilibrium and do not derive the general equilibrium problem to simplify the program since our main











Where x  is the Ramsey weighted number
Equation 7 determines the BRP for n-1 market. Given the budgetary constraint, the last
market price is determined endogenously by using the second first order condition. The price
















This procedure consists of imposing a budgetary equilibrium on water authorities and
generating RBP prices from the base year equilibrium. The results will permit us to measure
the impact on water users and the general equilibrium effect on other micro and
macroeconomic variables. With the RBP, we have a total of d prices for water. The
discrimination is based on the elasticity of demand of each consumer as stated previously and
not on socio-politico criteria. Once the BRP are generated, other simulations can be combined
with these new BRP, such as rainfall changes and external trade liberalization among others.
3.3. Water Production in Morocco
In Morocco, the production of water is principally made up of surface water retrieved
by dams. However, in periods of drought caused by the arid climate or by poor water
management programs, reservoirs are fully exploited and can be at critical levels. During these
periods, water management authorities (WMA) have to use other types of water harvesting
methods. In a first stage, they use more efficient surface water collection methods and, in a10
second stage, water pumping stations are exploited more intensively and at a certain level their
output could dominate the surface water output.
Thus, we distinguish two types of production in water technology. The first, Eb (type I),
represents the water produced by dams already in place. In our model, K  is the physical
capital invested in dams needed to produce Eb. In this part of the technology, the unit costs of
producing (surface) water are constant.
We define Wat (type II) as the second type of production. Wat represents the
combination of water production using more efficient efforts in retrieving surface water and
water from pumping stations. To produce a quantity of Wat, we use a composite input, Kl,
defined as a combination of capital, K, and labour, Ld. The use of these two inputs implies a
more efficient production of water by using better techniques for retrieving surface water and
for pumping underground water.
Production costs for water are characterized by decreasing marginal costs (mc), for the
first type of production when water produced from dams dominates. When water produced
from underground wells dominates, marginal costs are increasing. WMA are responsible for
producing, distributing and commercializing the water resource. In the production process they
must take into account both types of technologies and their cost function properties. The
utilities production structures are illustrated in figure 1.
Insert Figure 1: Here
The stylized facts of water production in Morocco presented above lead us to adopt the
following hypothesis. Since there are important distinctions in the hydro-geographic,
geological and rainfall characteristics, we decomposed water production into two distinct
regions; the North and the South. From Figure 3, we have Xs that is an aggregate of Ebeau
(type I) and Wat  (type II) related via an additive function. EBeau, is defined by a fixed relation
to its capital stock,  eau K . The second type is characterized as a Weibull technology, which has11
a composite factor, Kleau, as an input.  The composite factor, Kleau, is defined by a Leontief
(fixed coefficient) between capital Keau and labour Ldeau.
We define the description of the functional forms adopted as follows. The production
function for type I is:
9- rain K Eb h c
m
+ = ,
where c is a scale parameter, K  is the fixed capital used in dams already in place and
m is the Cobb-Douglas parameter. The second component of the equation introduces the
exogenous rainfall effect, where h is the share of the rainfall that contributes to the increase in
the water level of the reservoirs and rain is the exogenous rainfall variable.
For type II production we assume that the public authorities must resort to variable
production factors which are capital (K) and labour (Ld). Figure 2 depicts the output of water,
Wat, as a function of the composite factor Kl for the two regions. Below the inflection point,
production from dams dominates and to the right of the inflection point production from
pumping stations dominates.
Water production will have a variable marginal productivity. In the first part of
production of type II, the composite input will generate increasing marginal productivity. In
this interval, more efficient surface water recuperation techniques (dredging of water basins,
repair and maintenance of distribution system, etc.) are used intensively. As surface water
becomes scarce and difficult to capture, groundwater pumping becomes more dominant in
production. The pumping technology is characterized by decreasing marginal productivity.
When using the pumping technology, greater productive resources are needed to produce
additional units of water.  As production increases, the flow of water is reduced and the
distance to the resource increases. Thus, more fuel is needed to pump the same amount of12
water from the underground reserves to the surface. In the second interval of this type of
production, the decreasing marginal productivity of the pumping technology dominates the
increasing marginal productivity of dam production. The two-interval water production
function is depicted in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 : Here
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Parameter Yis  the upper limit of  the function or the maximum of the available water in each
region. This upper limit is decomposed into two exogenous components:
11- ) ( eau eau rain u v - = Y ,
where v is the maximum available water in normal rainfall situations, u is the share of rainfall
which increases the level of efficient rainfall and rainis the exogenous rainfall variable.
Parameters z  and f define the symmetry of the Weibull. The value ofz has an important role
in determining the inflection point as well as in determining the steepness of the curve (Sharif
and Islam (1981)). In a less pronounced fashion, f, which is a scale parameter, also influences
the steepness of the curve
6.
The two-interval water production technology is nested in these three parameters. Given
that no direct information is available for the values of z  and f, they will be calibrated by
taking into account Morocco’s water endowment and its actual potential capabilities of
harvesting.
                                                
6 For a detailed description of the calibration procedure for the Weibull parameters see Decaluwé et al. (1998).13
4. Applied General Equilibrium Models and Water Management
 AGE modeling has rarely been used to analyze water management policies. A first
model was presented by Berck, Robinson and Goldman (1991) in which they study the impact
of investment policies aimed towards the distribution of water in the San Joaquim Valley of
California in the United States. This model is disaggregated into 14 production branches with 6
of them being agricultural sectors. The model measures change in water endowments and its
effect on the economy. In this model, the authors define water as an exogenous stock with only
agriculture consuming water. A simulated reduction in water production generates a
substitution from agriculture to the livestock sector accompanied by a decrease in GDP, as well
as a reduction in agricultural income and labour demand.
On their part, Goldin and Roland-Holst (1995), study the relation between trade reform
and water management policies in Morocco. Their AGE model has four branches, two of
which are agricultural. These two agricultural branches are disaggregated on the basis of arid
and humid zones. They simulated three scenarios; an increase in water tariffs for agriculture, a
reduction in import duties and a combination of the first two. From the last simulation, they
conclude that this policy option will result in a reduction in the water demand, an increase in
the GDP and an improvement in household income. In spite of interesting results they impose
restrictive hypotheses in their model. Namely, using a production function for agriculture
branches that does not allow substitution between water and other intermediate consumption or
primary factors. Moreover, there is no production of water; they assume that the economy has a
fixed endowment of water. Finally, water is only consumed by the agricultural branches.
Decaluwé et al. (1998) depart from the standard model and apply a model that
integrates specific water production technology, substitution between intermediate agricultural
inputs and allows for possibilities of simulating exogenous rainfall variation. They simulate14
arbitrary water price increases, reduction in subsidies to water management authorities and a
reduction in average rainfall. They found that a 10% increase in water prices reduces water
demand by approximately 8% and reduces GDP by 0.13% as well as the subsidies to WMA.
The increase in prices are arbitrary and more efficient water pricing mechanisms could be
investigated. We start from Decaluwé et al. (1998) and introduce a number of changes that will
allow us to analyze different water pricing scenarios. In the next section we highlight the main
features of our model.
4.1. The Moroccan AGE model
The model is inspired by the Decaluwé et al. (1995) general equilibrium models which
in turn follow the modeling guidelines put forward by Shoven and Whalley (1984) as well as
Decaluwé et al. (1998).  As presented in the previous section, modifications were made to
capture stylized facts of water production in the model. As for the production technology of the
other production branches, a detailed presentation of their technology is put forward farther on
in this section.
 Four types of agents are incorporated in the model. They are household, firm,
government and rest of the world (ROW). We present the household utility function as Cobb-
Douglas Linear Expenditure System (CD-LES). This utility function allows for the
introduction of incompressible consumption in the household consumption basket.
To take into account the spatial variability of water in the model, we divided the
country into two distinct regions. The northern region is the area abundant in water and the
southern region is the arid part of the country. This regional disaggregation applies for water as
well as for agricultural and industrial branches. Both regions produce similar commodities15
linked by a CES function and sold on national and international market as a composite
commodity.
Considering the importance of water demand by the agricultural branches, it is
imperative to refine the production behavior (demand for inputs) of the branches in order to
capture the impact of water policies. Therefore it is essential to have a production technology
which allows for substitutability between primary factors and a certain intermediate level of
consumption. According to Just (1991), substitution between primary inputs is crucial for an
appropriate analysis of questions linked to water management. We incorporate the possibility
of substitution in the agricultural production function by using a nested constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) function (figure 3).
Insert Figure 3: Here
At the first level of the structure, the first nest combines the primary factors; capital
(Kag) and land (Landag). Following Burniaux et al. (1988), Boyd and Newman (1991) and Boyd
et al. (1992), we linked capital to land using a CES. The second nest of the first level
characterizes the relationship between fertilizer (Ferag) and water (Eauag). An explicit relation
between water and fertilizer is crucial in an agricultural production structure (Hexem and
Heady (1978)). Furthermore, empirical studies indicate that the potential for substitution can be
greater between intermediate consumption than between primary factors (Hertel et al. (1989)).
At the second level of the structure, we model the relationship between the intermediate
composite good, (Cieag) and the composite input Kcag, by linking them with a CES. At the third
level, a CES combines the composite Ipag with labour, (Ldag). By specifying the nested CES as
described above, an external shock disturbing agricultural water consumption will trickle down
to other intermediate consumption as well as primary factors via the four CES. At the last level
of the structure, we combined the composite Rxag, with the other intermediate consumption
(Ciaag), using a Leontief to give us the final production for the agricultural branch. The16
substitution elasticity parameters for this production structure were drawn from Binswinger
(1974), Ray (1982), Debertin et al. (1990) and Ali et al. (1992).
For the industrial branches, production is defined by a Leontief function at the top level,
linking the value-added (Va) to the total intermediate consumption (Cit). The Va is modeled as
a C-D function of capital (K) and labour (Ld). As for the relationships between the intermediate
consumption, we introduced more flexibility (than in standard models
7) by supposing that the
industrial producers could substitute intermediate consumption directly or indirectly when
relative prices of inputs change. Figure 4 presents the production structure of the industrial
branches.
Insert Figure 4: Here
The service branches are modeled in a standardized fashion, where the production is a
Leontief of  Va and the Cit. The value added is a C-D of K, and  Ld, and Cit is a Leontief (fixed
coefficient) of individual intermediate consumption.
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used in this paper was constructed using the Martens
(1995) SAM of Morocco. The main modifications brought to the SAM are a regional
disaggregation of the branches and the incorporation of water and fertilizer production
branches
8. The information concerning the production and the demand for the resource were
based on Mriouah (1992).
5. Water Pricing Scenarios
Seven scenarios were simulated on the base year equilibrium. The first consisted of
generating the BRP from the base year. In this simulation actual prices were replaced by the
                                                
7 In standard AGE modeling, intermediate consumption is assumed to be linked by a fixed coefficient with value
added.17
BRP by adding the equations’ corresponding BRP as well as the own-price elasticity equations.
The second scenario consisted of repeating the first and redistributing the gains from the new
BRP (elimination of the subsidies to the water management authorities) through a uniform
reduction of the distorted production tax (tx). For this simulation, the government’s deficit (Sg)
is exogenous and the uniform tax level is endogenous. In the third scenario, the gains were
redistributed to the household by a reduction in their income tax level
9. The fourth simulation
is a MCP simulation. The fifth is the MCP simulation with the gain going to the producers via
a uniform reduction in the production tax. As in the second simulation, tx is endogenous and Sg
is exogenous for this simulation. The sixth is MCP with the gain being redistributed to the
household (income tax endogenous and Sg exogenous). The last scenario is an arbitrary 10%
increase in the agricultural prices of water with no redistribution. The results of these scenarios
are presented in Table1
10.
Insert Table 1: here
5.1. Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing (1
st Simulation)
In the BRP scenario, water prices increase substantially for all of the agricultural
branches (Pwa for the north and Pwa for the south). In the north, the citrus branch had the
strongest increase with an increase of 98,53%. In the south, the largest increase was in food
crop agriculture with a 26,46% increase. Other water consumers (household and industries)
face a strong decrease in the water prices. Prices for households decreased by 47,10% in the
                                                                                                                                                         
8 Information for regional disaggregation was provided by T. Abdedkhalek of the “Institut National de Statistique
et de l’Économie Appliqués” in Rabat, Morocco.
9 In the second scenario, the production tax produces more distortion than the income tax since there is only one
household and the tax levels differ greatly from one sector to the other., and therefore the results should reflect
this fact.18
south and by 25,81% in the north
11. Water prices for industrial use drop by 39,01% in the south
and by 26,11% in the north. We also note that the government deficit significantly decreases
from 4,7 to 3,9 billion Dirhams. As for income, government revenues increased slightly by
0,55% mainly generated by an increase in the taxes on capital given that the return to capital
increases significantly. An essential objective of this policy is also reached. We observe an
important reduction in total water demand reaching 39,69% in the north and 11,86% in the
south.
The strong increase in water prices for the agriculture branches had a dramatic impact
on their level of output. The drop in output ranges from between 1,48% for the southern food
crop branch, and 9,19% for the citrus branch. As a consequence of this reduction of
agricultural output, factors were released from the agricultural sector and taken up by the other
sectors thereby increasing their production. We note that the production by the fertilizer branch
increases given the increase in demand by the agricultural sectors permitted by the substitution
effect between water and fertilizer in their production process. This sector increases its
production by 41,32%. As for the other sectors, the increases are 0,23% for services, 1,15% for
the southern industrial branch and 1,11% for the northern industrial branch.
This simulation also produced a somewhat surprising result insofar as the equivalent
variation decreases by 760. This strong drop of the household’s EV is caused by the strong
increase in agricultural prices (since these sectors face higher water prices). Since the
agricultural goods compose an important portion of the commited expenditures or “subsistence
minima” s leads to an important  drop in the supernumerary income. This pricing method is
should be more efficient than the actual pricing scheme, we expected an increase in the EV. In
                                                                                                                                                         
10 With the chosen closure (exogenous current account balance and nominal exchange rate) the real GDP in the
model is constant. Our analysis allows with to measure the reallocation impact of the different water pricing
policies.19
fact, one element of efficiency (elimination of subsidies to WMA) is not included in the
simulation and therefore part of the benefits of the pricing method is not carried on to the
agents. This case is presented in the second simulation where the gains are redistributed via an
endogenous uniform reduction in production tax.
5.2. BRP with production tax decrease (2nd simulation)
In the second scenario, the gains from the BRP are transmitted to the producers through
a uniform reduction in production taxes. The reduction in taxes is obtained by making the
government’s deficit exogenous and the production tax rate (uniform) endogenous.
The interesting result from this simulation is the reversal of the EV which becomes
positive with an increase of 33.19. The two sources of  this improvement come from the
increase in the wage (versus a decrease in the first simulation) and the reduction of prices of
commodities of the commited expenditure. We also note a stronger reduction in water
consumption (-12,18%) in the south than in the first simulation. In the north, the reduction in
water consumption (-39,67%) is practically the same as in the first simulation. The subsidies to
water-producing authorities are again eliminated but the government deficit is now held
constant. The increases in the price of water for agriculture are marginally larger for all
agricultural branches but the decreases in water prices for other water consumers are smaller.
The other results are similar to the previous simulation, however the highly taxed branches
benefit more from this policy. The industrial and fertilizer branches have a higher tax burden
when compared to the agricultural branches. For example, the industrial branches improve
their situation when compared to the first; an increase of 1,15% to 1,47% in the south and of
                                                                                                                                                         
11 Note that we have one aggregate household that consumes two water commodities at two different prices. We
did not decompose in two households since the regional (North-South) information was not available.20
1,11% to 1.41% in the north. The citrus branch for its part (low tax burden) goes from –9,19%
to –9,70%.
5.3. BRP with Income Tax Decrease (3nd simulation)
In this scenario, benefits from BRP are transmitted to the consumers via an endogenous
decrease in income tax. The reduction in income tax generated by the simulation is 22,59%.
The impact on the equivalent variation are almost identical to the previous case 32.23. The
improvement in the household welfare is transmitted directly via the decrease in income tax
and not through the wage or prices. As for water consumption and water prices, results are
almost identical to the first simulation. The negative effects on the agricultural branches are
slightly attenuated since the household, benefiting from this policy, attributes an important
weight on its total consumption of agricultural goods. This is explained by the fact that this
simulation consists in transferring the gains from Sg (or equivalently gains from total
investment, It) to household consumption. In other words, there is a shift of the It demand
component (first simulation) to the household demand component (third simulation).
Consequently, results shows that total investment went from an increase of 2,34% in the first
simulation, to 0.41% in the third, and that household consumption increased from –0,32% in
the first to 0.55%.
5.4. Marginal Cost Pricing (4
th Simulation)
In this fourth simulation, the impact of MCP is analyzed. Results indicate that with the
same prices charged to all water consumers in each region, the impact on the EV is negative
but the impact is not as strong as in the first scenario (-171.64 vs –760.00). However, the
reduction in water consumption is far less than in the three previous simulations; –7.96% in the
south and –4.89% in the north. As for the subsidies to WMA they were reduced by only21
18.58% in the north (compared to a 100% reduction in the first three simulations) and
increased significantly in the south by 90.95%. Given that the initial level of the subsidy in the
south represents only a small share of the total subsidy, the combined north-south reduction is
only 16.99%. The reduction in the government deficit is also much smaller than in the first
simulation (11.61%). Since water prices fell less drastically than in the BRP scenarios, the
negative impacts on agricultural branches are consequently smaller.
5.5. MCP with Tax Decrease (5
th and 6
th Simulations)
By comparing these two simulations with the second and third simulations, we can
conclude that the effects are similar. The major difference is that the degree of improvement is
more moderate since the gains (reduction of Sg) in the MCP simulation are smaller than the
gains of the BRP simulation. Comparing simulation two with five we notice that the
improvement in the EV is 793.19 (improvement between the first and second scenario) for the
second versus 530.99 for the fifth and for the third and sixth the improvements are 792.23
versus 528.20 respectively. This disparity is a consequence, of the smaller reduction in the
production tax level and income tax level; 18.98% versus 28.16% and 14.99% versus 22.59%,
respectively.
5.6. Arbitrary Water Price Increase for Agriculture Branches
This simulation consists of increasing water price for agricultural use by 10%. For this
scenario, results show a reduction in EV of 135.00 and only a modest reduction in water
consumption (7.02% in the north and 0.24% in the south). The subsidies to WMA also
decreased in both regions slightly by 15.03% in the north and 13.56% in the south. The
combined reduction is smaller than in the MCP scenario. This scenario is less efficient in22
attaining the initial objectives of reducing water consumption and subsidies then the two other
pricing policies and has significant negative impact on the households EV.
5.7. Sensitivity Analysis
The same set of simulations was performed on the model but with the substitution elasticity
parameters (of all production CES) reduced by 25%. The objective was to compare these
scenarios in more rigid economy
12. The results were quite interesting. For the MCP, results are
practically identical and less positive for the fifth and sixth simulation, but results for the BRP
show improvement in the welfare measure for the three scenarios. For the second and third
simulation the improvements are more the twofold. Generally the results show that the model
is quite robust to changes in elasticities of substitution
13.
________  Insert Table 2: here
As for the total impact on water demand (or production), the consumption is reduced by
17,82% in the south and 34,87% in the north. In this case, the reduction was stronger in the
south and smaller in the north. Since the water production in the north is much more important
(in terms of volume produced), the total water demand decreased by 5,6% more in the BRP
scenario than in the MCP scenario.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an AGE model that allows a comparative analysis of
alternative water pricing policies to replace actual inefficient water pricing policies, which are
                                                
12 A more rigid economy makes reference to an economy with weaker capabilities of substitution between water
inputs and other production inputs and consequently of weaker own-price elasticities of water demand for all
water consumers other than households.23
leading to the depletion of water resources combined with important deficits of WMA. Three
pricing policies were simulated, namely BRP, MCP and an arbitrary increase in agricultural
water prices. Results reveal that BRP combined with a reduction in distorted production taxes
(simulation 2) is the most efficient in reducing water consumption with a positive impact on
EV and eliminating WMA subsidies. MCP has a more positive (or less negative for the fourth
scenario) impact on the EV but is not as efficient in reducing water consumption and does not
eliminate subsidies (natural monopoly). As for the arbitrary increase in agricultural water
prices it generates negative effect on EV and only small reductions in water consumption and
subsidies to WMA.
Since any increase in agricultural water prices is an extremely sensitive political question,
it is imperative to clearly understand the impact of pricing policies on the economy as a whole.
In general, all pricing policies will have a negative impact on agricultural production since
actual prices are highly subsidized. Results show that the agricultural sector will be strongly
affected by these price increases and that gains from BRP on the EV are conditional on
reducing distortions in the economy arising from the benefits obtained from new prices.
It is also important the interpret the results of  this paper in the context of this given model
with it’s specific structure, parameters and closure hypothesis. Changing some of these
elements could lead to different conclusions. Moreover, the initial production point on the
marginal cost curve for the northern region (left of the minimum) likely leads to results being
better with the MCP versus the BRP (for some variables). Re-calibrating the model on a dryer
base year could lead to very different set of results. Given this, we still demonstrate the
importance of measuring the impact of these policy changes on water demand, water subsidies
                                                                                                                                                         
13 Further sensitivity analyses were performed on the model and results are available upon request from the
authors.24
household welfare but also on the agents that gain and the ones that lose. This is key in
implementing these highly sensitive policies.25
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Figure 4 : Production Structure for Industrial BranchesTable 1: Simulation Results
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6 Simulation 7
Variables Branches Base Year Level % Level % Level % Level % Level % Level % Level %
w 1.000 0.995 -0.51 1.006 0.56 0.996 -0.44 1.013 1.28 1.020 2.01 1.013 1.32 0.998 -0.18
Pwh EN 1.400 1.039 -25.81 1.050 -25.01 1.040 -25.73 0.761 -45.63 0.769 -45.11 0.761 -45.61 1.400 0.00
Pwh ES 1.800 0.952 -47.10 0.963 -46.50 0.953 -47.07 0.965 -46.37 0.972 -45.98 0.966 -46.36 1.800 0.00
Pwi EN 1.400 1.034 -26.11 1.044 -25.41 1.035 -26.04 0.761 -45.63 0.769 -45.10 0.761 -45.61 1.400 0.00
Pwi ES 1.800 0.976 -45.79 0.986 -45.23 0.976 -45.77 0.965 -46.37 0.972 -45.98 0.966 -46.36 1.600 0.00
It 35.047 35.866 2.34 35.391 0.98 35.189 0.41 36.122 3.07 35.804 2.16 35.661 1.75 35.166 0.34
Ch 83.465 83.194 -0.32 84.031 0.68 83.921 0.55 84.585 1.34 85.158 2.03 85.068 1.92 83.333 -0.16
Yh 100.993 100.666 -0.32 101.679 0.68 100.726 -0.26 102.349 1.34 103.042 2.03 102.381 1.37 100.834 -0.16
Sh 14.017 13.972 -0.32 14.112 0.68 14.094 0.55 14.205 1.34 14.301 2.03 14.286 1.92 13.995 -0.16
Yg 22.730 22.854 0.55 22.054 -2.97 22.048 -3.00 23.126 1.74 22.582 -0.65 22.580 -0.66 22.729 0.00
Sg -4.700 -3.894 -17.16 -4.700 0.00 -4.700 0.00 -4.155 -11.61 -4.700 0.00 -4.700 0.00 -4.543 -3.35
Ty 1.000 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.774 -22.59 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.850 -14.99 1.000 0.00
Tx 1.000 1.000 0.00 0.718 -28.16 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.810 -18.98 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00
Cab 7.997 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00
P
index 1.000 1.003 0.33 1.008 0.85 1.004 0.39 1.016 1.55 1.019 1.91 1.016 1.58 0.999 -0.05
EV -760.00 33.19 32.23 -171.64 359.35 356.56 -135.00
Xs AUGRS 4.847 4.708 -2.86 4.685 -3.33 4.687 -3.30 4.798 -1.02 4.780 -1.37 4.783 -1.32 4.821 -0.53
Xs GRAIS 2.711 2.658 -1.97 2.665 -1.70 2.668 -1.59 2.688 -0.86 2.692 -0.69 2.695 -0.60 2.700 -0.40
Xs MARAS 1.447 1.425 -1.48 1.433 -0.97 1.433 -0.96 1.438 -0.62 1.443 -0.28 1.443 -0.27 1.442 -0.32
Xs AUGRN 9.088 8.720 -4.04 8.679 -4.50 8.682 -4.47 8.970 -1.29 8.938 -1.64 8.943 -1.59 9.029 -0.64
Xs GRAIN 6.715 6.521 -2.89 6.539 -2.61 6.545 -2.53 6.645 -1.04 6.656 -0.87 6.662 -0.79 6.683 -0.48
Xs MARAN 2.625 2.551 -2.83 2.563 -2.36 2.564 -2.34 2.601 -0.93 2.609 -0.63 2.610 -0.59 2.613 -0.46
Xs AGRUN 2.152 1.954 -9.19 1.943 -9.70 1.955 -9.15 2.081 -3.32 2.070 -3.80 2.081 -3.29 2.118 -1.58
Xs SERNM 21.522 21.617 0.44 21.360 -0.75 21.603 0.38 21.248 -1.27 21.078 -2.06 21.241 -1.31 21.559 0.17
Xs INDS 17.406 17.606 1.15 17.662 1.47 17.557 0.87 17.456 0.29 17.494 0.50 17.424 0.10 17.449 0.25
Xs INDN 104.134 105.290 1.11 105.603 1.41 104.994 0.83 104.405 0.26 104.619 0.47 104.212 0.07 104.385 0.24
Xs FERN 1.013 1.431 41.32 1.488 46.97 1.417 39.93 2.246 121.81 2.294 126.50 2.231 120.28 1.010 -0.24
Xs ES 0.382 0.336 -11.86 0.335 -12.18 0.336 -11.87 0.351 -7.96 0.350 -8.26 0.351 -7.97 0.355 -7.02
Xs EN 1.993 1.202 -39.69 1.202 -39.67 1.200 -39.77 1.895 -4.89 1.886 -5.35 1.893 -5.02 1.826 -8.35
Xs SERM 63.488 63.632 0.23 63.747 0.41 63.811 0.51 63.224 -0.42 63.304 -0.29 63.344 -0.23 63.550 0.10
Sve EAUN 0.614 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.500 -18.58 0.497 -18.98 0.499 -18.62 0.522 -15.03
Sve EAUS 0.009 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.017 90.95 0.017 89.07 0.017 90.90 0.008 -13.56
mc ES 1.016 0.914 -10.06 0.925 -8.97 0.914 -10.01 0.965 -4.96 0.972 -4.27 0.966 -4.94 0.951 -6.35
mc EN 0.744 0.871 16.98 0.883 18.57 0.872 17.16 0.761 2.25 0.769 3.24 0.761 2.29 0.749 0.65
Pwa AUGRN 0.600 1.191 98.53 1.198 99.67 1.192 98.62 0.761 26.85 0.769 28.09 0.761 26.91 0.660 10.00
Pwa GRAIN 0.600 1.134 89.04 1.142 90.39 1.135 89.17 0.761 26.85 0.769 28.09 0.761 26.91 0.660 10.00
Pwa MARAN 0.600 1.151 91.81 1.159 93.10 1.152 91.92 0.761 26.85 0.769 28.09 0.761 26.91 0.660 10.00
Pwa AGRUN 0.600 1.120 86.59 1.128 87.99 1.120 86.72 0.761 26.85 0.769 28.09 0.761 26.91 0.660 10.00
Pwa AUGRS 0.800 1.006 25.71 1.015 26.89 1.006 25.76 0.965 20.66 0.972 21.54 0.966 20.69 0.880 10.00
Pwa GRAIS 0.800 1.000 25.04 1.010 26.24 1.001 25.09 0.965 20.66 0.972 21.54 0.966 20.69 0.880 10.00
Pwa MARAS 0.800 1.012 26.46 1.021 27.63 1.012 26.51 0.965 20.66 0.972 21.54 0.966 20.69 0.880 10.00
*Values are in billion Dirhams (except for prices)28
Table 2: Simulation Results for Rigid Economy
Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6 Simulation 7
Variables Branches Base Year Level % Level % Level % Level % Level % Level % Level %
w 1.000 0.997 -0.31 1.008 0.77 0.998 -0.24 1.011 1.15 1.018 1.83 1.012 1.19 0.998 -0.16
Pwh EN 1.400 0.926 -33.87 0.938 -33.03 0.927 -33.79 0.759 -45.77 0.766 -45.30 0.759 -45.75 1.400 0.00
Pwh ES 1.800 0.955 -46.95 0.966 -46.32 0.955 -46.92 0.973 -45.97 0.979 -45.59 0.973 -45.96 1.800 0.00
Pwi EN 1.400 0.985 -29.66 0.995 -28.94 0.986 -29.60 0.759 -45.77 0.766 -45.30 0.759 -45.75 1.400 0.00
Pwi ES 1.800 0.982 -45.47 0.992 -44.90 0.982 -45.44 0.973 -45.97 0.979 -45.59 0.973 -45.96 1.600 0.00
It 35.047 35.890 2.41 35.412 1.04 35.209 0.46 36.010 2.75 35.719 1.92 35.587 1.54 35.159 0.32
Ch 83.465 83.320 -0.17 84.165 0.84 84.052 0.70 84.457 1.19 84.988 1.83 84.904 1.72 83.345 -0.14
Yh 100.993 100.818 -0.17 101.840 0.84 100.879 -0.11 102.194 1.19 102.837 1.83 102.225 1.22 100.848 -0.14
Sh 14.017 13.993 -0.17 14.135 0.84 14.116 0.70 14.184 1.19 14.273 1.83 14.259 1.72 13.997 -0.14
Yg 22.730 22.861 0.58 22.056 -2.97 22.050 -2.99 23.079 1.53 22.578 -0.67 22.576 -0.68 22.727 -0.01
Sg -4.700 -3.888 -17.28 -4.700 0.00 -4.700 0.00 -4.198 -10.69 -4.700 0.00 -4.700 0.00 -4.550 -3.21
Ty 1.000 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.773 -22.70 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.862 -13.83 1.000 0.00
Tx 1.000 1.000 0.00 0.717 -28.31 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00 0.825 -17.52 1.000 0.00 1.000 0.00
Cab 7.997 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00 7.997 0.00
P
index 1.000 1.004 0.44 1.010 0.96 1.005 0.49 1.014 1.37 1.017 1.71 1.014 1.40 1.000 -0.04
EV -707.35 88.48 88.05 -156.03 333.72 330.73 -129.69
Xs AUGRS 4.847 4.737 -2.28 4.715 -2.73 4.715 -2.71 4.806 -0.85 4.791 -1.15 4.793 -1.12 4.826 -0.43
Xs GRAIS 2.711 2.670 -1.52 2.677 -1.24 2.680 -1.14 2.692 -0.69 2.697 -0.52 2.698 -0.46 2.702 -0.32
Xs MARAS 1.447 1.429 -1.24 1.436 -0.72 1.436 -0.72 1.439 -0.53 1.444 -0.21 1.444 -0.21 1.443 -0.28
Xs AUGRN 9.088 8.776 -3.43 8.736 -3.86 8.738 -3.85 8.988 -1.10 8.960 -1.40 8.964 -1.36 9.039 -0.53
Xs GRAIN 6.715 6.554 -2.39 6.574 -2.10 6.578 -2.03 6.657 -0.86 6.669 -0.69 6.672 -0.63 6.688 -0.40
Xs MARAN 2.625 2.559 -2.52 2.571 -2.06 2.572 -2.03 2.604 -0.83 2.611 -0.54 2.612 -0.52 2.615 -0.41
Xs AGRUN 2.152 1.999 -7.11 1.989 -7.57 2.000 -7.07 2.097 -2.56 2.089 -2.92 2.098 -2.53 2.126 -1.20
Xs SERNM 21.522 21.575 0.25 21.316 -0.96 21.560 0.18 21.278 -1.13 21.119 -1.87 21.271 -1.17 21.555 0.15
Xs INDS 17.406 17.569 0.93 17.622 1.24 17.519 0.65 17.452 0.27 17.486 0.46 17.422 0.09 17.441 0.20
Xs INDN 104.134 105.075 0.90 105.377 1.19 104.779 0.62 104.391 0.25 104.580 0.43 104.212 0.08 104.339 0.20
Xs FERN 1.013 1.483 46.47 1.540 52.11 1.469 45.06 2.095 106.88 2.139 111.19 2.082 105.58 1.011 -0.21
Xs ES 0.382 0.345 -9.53 0.344 -9.76 0.345 -9.54 0.356 -6.74 0.355 -6.96 0.356 -6.75 0.361 -5.43
Xs EN 1.993 1.385 -30.52 1.385 -30.52 1.383 -30.60 1.908 -4.27 1.902 -4.54 1.906 -4.36 1.864 -6.48
Xs SERM 63.488 63.552 0.10 63.666 0.28 63.731 0.38 63.254 -0.37 63.326 -0.26 63.364 -0.20 63.535 0.07
Sve EAUN 0.614 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.501 -18.35 0.499 -18.67 0.501 -18.39 0.525 -14.39
Sve EAUS 0.009 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.000 -100.00 0.014 57.53 0.014 54.38 0.014 57.39 0.008 -6.75
mc ES 1.016 0.932 -8.26 0.944 -7.10 0.932 -8.21 0.973 -4.25 0.979 -3.58 0.973 -4.23 0.964 -5.08
mc EN 0.744 0.812 9.06 0.823 10.55 0.813 9.18 0.759 1.98 0.766 2.88 0.759 2.02 0.747 0.41
Pwa AUGRN 0.600 1.157 92.92 1.165 94.22 1.158 93.03 0.759 26.53 0.766 27.64 0.759 26.57 0.660 10.00
Pwa GRAIN 0.600 1.094 82.33 1.103 83.79 1.095 82.46 0.759 26.53 0.766 27.64 0.759 26.57 0.660 10.00
Pwa MARAN 0.600 1.112 85.40 1.121 86.81 1.113 85.52 0.759 26.53 0.766 27.64 0.759 26.57 0.660 10.00
Pwa AGRUN 0.600 1.078 79.61 1.087 81.11 1.078 79.75 0.759 26.53 0.766 27.64 0.759 26.57 0.660 10.00
Pwa AUGRS 0.800 1.005 25.63 1.014 26.81 1.005 25.68 0.973 21.56 0.979 22.42 0.973 21.59 0.880 10.00
Pwa GRAIS 0.800 1.001 25.11 1.010 26.31 1.001 25.16 0.973 21.56 0.979 22.42 0.973 21.59 0.880 10.00
Pwa MARAS 0.800 1.010 26.21 1.019 27.37 1.010 26.26 0.973 21.56 0.979 22.42 0.973 21.59 0.880 10.00
*Values are in billion Dirhams (except for prices)29